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I. Introduction 
There are fundamental differences between the continental legal tradition 
and the common law tradition as regards the question of whether a creditor 
is entitled to specific performance or whether he has to content himself with 
damages. Generally speaking, it could be said that the continental tradition 
has always seen specific performance as the primary remedy against non-
performing debtors, whereas the Anglo-American system sees claiming 
damages as the primary remedy. Nevertheless, specific performance does 
play a role in equity, where the courts are certainly competent to award such 
a claim to the plaintiff. 
This does not mean, however, that on the continent specific performance is 
the proper remedy in all instances. This paper focuses on a rather problema-
tic category, viz the enforcement of obligations to perform a certain act. We 
are dealing here with something the debtor has to do other than convey pos-
session. In the Corpus iuris civilis the latter was what the vendor was obliga-
ted to perform. It took a single moment of his time and could easily be en-
forced by the limb of the law, only requiring an ephemeral infringement of 
his physical integrity. In many jurisdictions nowadays, however, this is quite 
different. A vendor may be obligated to transfer ownership, not just posses-
sion, and transferring ownership may require his cooperation with certain 
formalities prescribed by law. Most kinds of acting other than just transfer-
ring possession imply an active attitude on the part of the debtor. These – la-
bour, services, constructing something, performing a legal act and so on – are 
more problematical to enforce than the transfer of possession. In all these in-
stances the civilian tradition speaks about mere factum, a mere acting, and in 
all these instances it is hardly conceivable that if the debtor persists in his 
stubbornness, enforcement can be achieved without infringing on the debt-
or’s physical or mental integrity. Not only does such infringement raise all 
kinds of practical objections, but it also clashes with the idea that freedom is 
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an indefeasible right. What determines how the dilemma is resolved? Is it fi-
delity to the given word or human freedom? 
The idea that human freedom has to be observed is not just an idea that 
emerged at the time of the Enlightenment or as part of the increasing aware-
ness of constitutional rights in the nineteenth century. This principle was al-
ready present in the legal doctrines of the Middle Ages. Although it was not 
observed for the indirect enforcement of monetary debts, viz through incar-
ceration, it prevented some jurists from justifying actual enforcement of obli-
gations to do. According to the Italian jurist Dinus de Mugello (1253-1298), 
who taught at Pistoia, the actual enforcement of an obligation to do would 
imply a kind of slavery, and that could not be justified. The argument to 
support this view was found in the Digest, where it was argued that when 
someone was denied the possibility to depart from where he was, his posi-
tion resembled that of a slave (D. 43.29.1-2).1 Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1314-
1357) developed a general rule for all contractual obligations to a mere act-
ing, viz that they could not be enforced in specie, but that the debtor could 
discharge himself by offering damages since, alongside the obligation to do, 
a second obligation, viz to pay damages, was supposed to have come into ex-
istence.2 The first to phrase this rule as a maxim was the French jurist and 
magistrate Antoine Favre (1557-1624): nobody can be compelled to act specif-
ically (nemo precise ad factum cogi potest).3  
 
II. Indirect coercive measures to enforce obligations to do 
But what was the practical meaning of this maxim in the early modern peri-
od, when reception of Roman law on the continent had taken place? It was 
hardly ever taken as a rule of substantive law: the creditor was certainly enti-
tled to the act, the debtor obligated himself to perform. Just as in Bartolus’ 
doctrine, the only principal rule acknowledged was that the creditor could 
not be sentenced to specific performance. Thus, the maxim was limited to 
procedural law. Occasionally, however, the maxim seemed to be only a rule 
                                                
1  See for this view of Dinus de Mugello: T. Repgen, Vertragstreue und Erfüllungs-
zwang in der mittelalterlichen Rechtswissenschaft Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft-
liche Veröffentlichungen der Görres-Gesellschaft, NF 73 (Paderborn etc. 1994) 
p.160-162.  
2  J.H. Dondorp, ‘Precise cogi. Enforcing specific performance in medieval legal 
scholarship’ in: J. Hallebeek, H. Dondorp (eds), The Right to Specific Perfor-
mance. The Historical Development Ius Commune Europaeum 82 (Antwerp etc. 
2010) p. 21-56, at p. 50-52. 
3  Antonius Faber, Rationalia in Pandectas II (Lyons 1659) ad D. 8.5.6.2 (p. 248): 
‘Nemo ad factum precise cogi potest, quia sine ui et impressione id fieri non potest, 
ideoque in obligationibus faciendi succedit praestatio eius quod interest.’ 
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of execution law: although courts had the competence to sentence debtors to 
perform in specie the act they owed their creditor, ultimately the verdict could 
not be executed if the debtor persisted in his stubbornness.4 
We do see in the early modern period that all kinds of indirect coercive 
measures could be applied with the aim of changing the debtor’s mind, so 
that eventually he would voluntarily perform the act to which he was 
obliged. Direct enforcement (praecise cogi) was not allowed, but indirect en-
forcement (civiliter cogi) was.5 Many of these measures had their origins be-
yond the sphere of enforcing contractual obligations to do. Civil custody had 
its precursors in the Roman incarceration for monetary debts (C. 4.10.12), in 
the canon law practice of indirectly compelling clerics to adopt an ecclesiasti-
cal office (D.74 c.3) or in the otage (France) or the Leisten (German territories) 
of indigenous law. Although civil custody was prohibited by the 
Reichspolizeiordnung (title 17 § 10) in 1577, it became the common practice in 
the Province of Holland.6 Initially it may have been intended to enforce only 
monetary debts and contracts of sale, but from seventeenth-century authors 
such as Simon Groenewegen van der Made (1613-1652) and Simon van 
Leeuwen (1627-1682) onwards it was assumed that civil custody was gener-
ally applicable. In other words, also as a means of indirectly enforcing a cer-
tain act the debtor has to perform.7  
A second indirect coercive measure consisted in imposing monetary fines. 
These also had their origins in Roman law, viz in the iusiurandum in litem 
(D. 12.3.5 and D. 19.2.48.1), which was mostly pronounced in an interlocu-
tory verdict (pronuntiatio). This was possible when the claim, an actio arbitrar-
ia, was based on property rights, aimed at exhibit, or based on a contract of 
                                                
4  See for the interpretation of the maxim in the early-modern period: J.H. 
Dondorp, ‘Specific performance: a historical perspective’ in: J. Smits et al. 
(eds.), Specific performance in Contract Law: National and other Perspectives (Ant-
werp etc. 2008) p. 265-285; J. Hallebeek and Th. Merkel, ‘Simon van Groe-
newegen van der Made on the enforcement of ‘obligationes faciendi’ in: The 
Right to Specific Performance, p. 81-96.  
5  The term was used by Ulric Huber (1636-1694) in his Praelectionum juris civilis 
tomi tres (III. 16 no. 6). See also K. Nehlsen-von Stryk, ‘Grenzen des Rechts-
zwangs: zur Geschichte der Naturalvollstreckung’ Archiv für die civilistische 
Praxis 193 (1993) p. 529-554, at p. 547-548. 
6  See: Ampliatie van de Instructie van den Hove van Holland, art. 14 (21 December 
1579) in: C. Cau, Groot Placaet-boeck II (‘s-Gravenhage 1664) p. 770; Ordonnantie 
van de Iustitie in den steden en ten platten lande van Holland, art. 31 (1 April 1580) 
in: Cau GPB II, p. 702-703) and Instructie van de Hoge Raad, art. 275 (31 May 
1582) in: Cau GPB II, p. 833-834.  
7  In the nineteenth-century codifications, however, civil imprisonment was 
mostly allowed in only a restricted number of specific cases. 
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good faith.8 The procedural ordinance of the Reichskammergericht from 1555 
acknowledged the possibility of imposing fines in order to enforce a sentence 
to perform a certain act.9 Although civil custody and monetary fines may 
have been the most important indirect means of enforcing a condemning 
verdict, there were certainly more of such means having their origins in the 
Middle Ages, including the billeting of soldiers or court clerks in the debtor’s 
home or the taking of pledges.  
 
III. A historical and comparative diptych: direct enforcement of 
obligations to do 
More problematic, however, is the direct enforcement of a mere act. Not only 
will this encounter all kinds of practical difficulties, the main objection to 
such enforcement is that it is inconceivable without a serious violation of the 
debtor’s freedom through an infringement of his physical and mental integri-
ty. It could be argued that the continental legal tradition also accepted the 
use of armed force (manu militari) as a means of enforcing property rights 
and sale contracts. However, these forms of enforcement required the use of 
force for only a single moment in order to reach the desired aim, whereas en-
forcement of, for example, a labour contract from an unwilling employee is 
not possible without a continuous application of force. Moreover, enforce-
ment of property rights and sale contracts only requires the defendant to tol-
erate the enforcement, not to actively cooperate, as is the case in all obliga-
tions where the debtor has to perform a certain act. 
Nevertheless we can identify certain instances in the continental legal tradi-
tion where direct enforcement was justified. Two such instances are dis-
cussed below in order to answer the question of what justified infringement 
of the debtor’s integrity. These cases involve a more practical and locally em-
bedded manifestation of the ius commune, fitting in with the nature of this 
volume on local legal history, which is dedicated to my former colleague 
Paul van Peteghem. We can also ask ourselves whether these two instances 
are examples of a more extensive category of obligations to do, where direct 
                                                
8  See: H. Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe in der mittelalterlichen Rechtstheorie 
Forschungen zur neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte 2 (Münster and Cologne 
1955) p. 83-84. 
9  Reichskammergerichtsordnung 3. XLVIII Von execution und volnziehung der 
urtheyl. Cf. A. Laufs (ed.), Die Reichskammergerichtsordnung von 1555 Quellen 
und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich 3 (Cologne etc. 
1976) p. 264 ff. The astreinte we are familiar with nowadays, however, i.e. the 
pecuniary fine to be paid to the creditor and accruing for each day of non-
compliance, has its origins in late nineteenth-century French case law. 
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coercive measures were considered justified, or whether, by contrast, they 
should be regarded as atypical solutions for a limited number of atypical 
cases and deviating from what was supposed to be the principal rule.  
 
(a) The copyist 
The first instance involves a situation where a debtor was physically forced 
to perform. It was recorded by the thirteenth-century jurist Odofredus († 
1265). In his Lecture on the Justinian Code, he described the outcome of an 
enquiry by the ‘old doctors’ of Bologna, who had gathered in the Church of 
St Peter to be heard on a certain matter.10 The situation under dispute in-
volved a contract of work between a scholar and a copyist. The copyist had 
obligated himself to work for a full year and to perform the work personally. 
In other words, with his own hands. Although the general rule, based on D. 
42.1.13.1, D. 3.3.45pr and D. 45.1.59, was that no-one could be compelled to 
perform an act in specie, it was decided in this specific case that this rule 
should be set aside. The copyist could not discharge himself by paying dam-
ages, nor by having the work performed by a substitute. The main reason for 
this would be that another copyist would not have the same handwriting. 
Odofredus rephrased the decision of the ‘old doctors’ and the reasoning be-
hind it, without mentioning the specific and explicit commitment of the co-
pyist to perform the work personally. He simply stated that hardly anyone 
could be found who was capable of finishing the job without a noticeable dif-
ference in handwriting. In other contracts of work, however, it did not matter 
so much if the work was performed by another person. The work of one 
bricklayer could hardly be discerned from that of another bricklayer, but this 
could not be said for a copyist because hardly any man or any hand could 
continue the original copyist’s work in a similar way. 
Since it was decided to set aside the principal rule in this case, the copyist 
could be put in foot-shackles (compedes).11 It may be questioned whether the 
application of such means points towards the usual detention or incarcera-
tion as a form of civil custody for monetary debts as the text does not refer to 
incarceration or anything similar. It is more likely that the copyist was 
chained to his desk to force him to finish the work. Other medieval sources 
confirm that it was not unusual to put unwilling copyists in irons at their 
master’s home until the work was finished. According to the Speculum iudi-
ciale of Wilhelm Durand (ca. 1230-1296), this was in any event a generally ac-
                                                
10  This wording ‘old doctors’ may refer to previous generations of Bolognese 
scholars, probably from the early thirteenth century.  
11  Ad 4.65.22, see: Odofredus, Lectura super Codice I, (Lyons 1552 (reprint Bologna 
1968)) f. 259ra.-b. 
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cepted and customary measure when it was agreed upon that the copyist 
would remain in his master’s home until the work was completed.12 A four-
teenth-century chartulary, the Codex Dunensis, contains a document record-
ing the contract between an English copyist, established in Orleans, and a fri-
ar named Leonis (possibly a Jean le Lion from around 1268). The copyist had 
taken it upon himself to copy the apparatus of Innocent on the Decretals and 
not to accept any other work until this assignment was completed. He also 
agreed that if he were in any way not to fulfil his duty, he would endure cap-
tivity in his master’s home, be put in irons and not leave the house until the 
work was completely finished.13 Although this contract contains specific 
clauses that are lacking in the writings of most of the learned jurists, it indi-
cates once again that the use of foot-shackles was not unusual as a direct co-
ercive measure to be applied to unwilling copyists. Guillaume de Cunh († 
1335), Professor of Civil Law at Toulouse, stated more generally that if a 
debtor had to perform work requiring his personal effort, he was not entitled 
to discharge himself by assigning his assets, but should be put in foot-
shackles until the work was finished.14 
Unlike civil custody this measure is not directed at changing the copyist’s 
will so that he will perform the work voluntarily, but consists in physical 
pressure to directly enforce performance. The copyist will not be released in 
order to perform his obligation. On the contrary, in order for the copyist to 
be released, the work must first be completed. In other words, the issue here 
involves direct enforcement of an obligation to do by an infringement of the 
debtor’s physical integrity. 
Odofredus also referred in his Lecture on the Digest to the decision of the 
‘old doctors’, which is said here to have been taken unanimously. The un-
willing copyist could be put in fetters if he obligated himself to produce a 
work which, from the beginning, would be monomorphic (opus continue, ut 
incepit) and to perform the work with his own hands. It was also emphasized 
                                                
12  See: Wilhelm Durantis, Speculum iudiciale (Basle 1574 (reprint Aalen 1975)) lib. 
II, partic. II, De renunciatione et conclusione no. 29 (tom. I, p. 760): ‘In scriptoribus 
autem ualere potest, si conueniant, ut debeant in certo loco stare, uel scribere, quo 
casu etiam in compedibus poterunt retineri. Et idem in obsidibus, ut extra de iureiur. 
Ex rescripto (X 2.24.9), propter consuetudinem generalem secundum Vber[tum de 
Bobbio]’. The examples are discussed more fully by Frank Soetermeer in a pa-
per, the title of which nevertheless suggests that the examples involved a form 
of civil detention. See: F.P.W. Soetermeer, ‘La carcerazione del copista’ Rivista 
internazionale di diritto comune 6 (1995) p. 153-189, at p. 180-181. 
13  J.B.M.C. Kervyn de Lettenhove (ed.), Codex Dunensis sive Diplomatum et charta-
rum Medii Aevi amplissima collectio (Brussels 1875) no. 133 (p. 216). 
14  Lectura Codicis (Lyons 1513 (reprint Bologna 1968)) ad C. 7.71 (f. 93ra.): ‘Item 
dico quod debet poni iste in compedibus donec factum quod promisit compleuerit’. 
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once again that this decision applied only to copyists and not to other crafts-
men.15 Although it remains somewhat unclear as to whether the promise to 
perform the work personally was a necessary requirement for setting the 
principal rule aside, in the case of such a promise it was anyway more justi-
fied to chain the copyist.16  
Whereas Odofredus finds justification for compelling a copyist directly to 
perform the work he took upon himself in the fact that no handwriting is the 
same and the copyist cannot simply be replaced by another copyist, later ju-
rists seem to search for justification in the public interest. This can be seen in 
the gloss siue ad D. 39.1.21.4, which was probably added to the Ordinary 
Gloss at a later stage.17 Two reasons for justifying enforcing the performance 
are mentioned, viz firstly that the public interest, i.e. the study of jurispru-
dence, should not be disrupted, and secondly that the magistrate’s edict 
should not be disparaged.18 Similarly, Guillaume de Cunh stated that if 
someone had to copy a book, the public interest was at stake.19 Such an ap-
proach seems to have become the prevailing view until influential commen-
tators, such as Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400), following Dinus de Mugello, 
once again made a stand for attaching greater importance to human freedom.  
 
(b) The fiancé 
The second example stems from the Roman-Dutch Law of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. This time the obligation to be enforced results from 
the betrothal obligating the fiancé to enter into a marriage with his intended 
wife. In the Protestant Northern Netherlands matrimony was no longer seen 
as a sacrament and the secular authorities claimed superior jurisdiction in 
matrimonial affairs. The legacy of catholic, medieval canon law was never-
theless still present, as appears from the references to pre-reformation canon 
law and to authors from the Southern Netherlands, where canon law was 
                                                
15  Ad D. 39.1.21.4, see: Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto novo, f. 11rb.-11va. 
16  Ad D. 42.1.13.1, see: Odofredus, Lectura super Digesto novo, f. 78vb. 
17  According to Frank Soetermeer (‘La carcerazione del copista’, p. 174-175) it is 
an addition by Accursius’ son Cervotto (ca. 1240-1287).  
18  The gloss siue ad D. 39.1.21.4: ‘Ex hac littera collige argumentum, quod scriptor 
potest cogi precise ad scribendum et poni in compedibus, uel tenetur ad interesse, si 
hoc placet scholari, arg. quod met. cau. Si cum excep. § Perinde (D. 4.2.14.9 i.f.) et ita 
concordant omnes doctores Bononie residentes. Et est ratio, ne turbetur publica utili-
tas, id est studium, et hic ne contemnatur edictum praetoris.’ 
19  Lectura Codicis, ad C. 7.71 (fol. 93ra.): ‘quando quis debet facere librum, tractatur de 
utilitate publica’. 
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still applied.20 However, the title on betrothals and marriages in the Liber Ex-
tra (De sponsalibus et matrimonio) contained an antinomy. Whereas the decre-
tal Ex litteris (X 4.1.10) seemed to state that a betrothal could (indirectly) be 
enforced, the decretals Praeterea (X 4.1.2) and Requisiuit (X 4.1.17) seemed to 
indicate the opposite.  
The canonists of the sixteenth century had defended divergent solutions in 
their interpretation of these texts. In one of his consilia, Nicolaas Everaerts 
(1462-1532), once president of the Court of Holland, defended the traditional 
majority stance. Even if a betrothal was not confirmed by oath, the fiancé 
may be compelled by ecclesiastical sanctions (censura) to fulfil the matrimo-
nial formalities, unless there was a ponderous reason not to do so. He re-
ferred in support of this view to Hostiensis (Henricus de Segusio, † 1271) and 
Panorminatus (Nicolaus de Tudeschis, 1386-1445). He did not consider the 
decretal Requisiuit to be a counter-argument because it applied to situations 
where there was a ponderous reason for not using coercive measures. Al-
though every marriage required the free consent of both partners, this re-
quirement excluded only external (extrinsecus) and not internal (intrinsecus) 
coercion.21 
The majority stance was on occasions questioned. In Castile, Diego de Co-
varuvias y Leyva (1512-1577) and Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) were of the 
opinion that the unwilling fiancé should be admonished, but that ecclesiasti-
cal sanctions should not be applied since these would prevent the free con-
sent that was required for every valid marriage.22 A harmonizing interpreta-
tion of the antinomy between X 4.1.10 and X 4.1.17 was presented by the 
Spanish Jesuit Thomas Sanchez (1550-1610). The unwilling fiancé should be 
compelled to enter into the marriage only if this would not cause any kind of 
serious evil or scandal (gravia mala et scandala), such as continual dissent and 
slanging matches between the spouses or result in the man leaving his wife. 
Thus enforcement was possible, unless a sound reason would render this in-
                                                
20  On the influence of catholic canon law on the secural matrimonial law in the 
Northern Netherlands see: J. Witte, ‘The plight of canon law in the early Dutch 
Republic’ in: R.H. Helmholz (ed.), Canon law in protestant lands Comparative 
studies in continental and Anglo-American legal history 11 (Berlin 1992) p. 
135-164, at p. 160-163. 
21  Nicolaus Everardus, Consilia sive responsa (Arnhem 1642) consilium 178, no. 7 
(p. 645). 
22  For an overview of the various arguments see Ioannes Gutierrez, De iuramento 
confirmatorio et aliis in iure variis resolutionibus (Antwerp 1618) pars I, cap. 51, 
no. 4 (p. 171-172). 
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convenient.23 Paul van Christynen (1553-1631) followed this view in his rec-
ord of the case law of the Great Council of Malines (1626).24 
Antonio Perez (1583-1672), who lectured at Louvain, compared betrothal 
with other contracts. He claimed that non-compliance with the agreement 
justified legal remedies in view of the damage inflicted. A man could not 
withdraw from a betrothal without serious prejudice to his future wife and 
injury to her family. Here the maxim applied that nobody was allowed to 
change his intention to the prejudice of another (mutare consilium quis non 
potest in alterius detrimentum, VI 5.13.33).25 
The Protestant Roman-Dutch jurists shared the majority view amongst the 
canonists that betrothals should be enforced. In his treatise on Roman provi-
sions that were abrogated Simon Groenewegen van der Made, secretary of 
the city of Delft, taught that the rule of C. 5.1.1, whereby a betrothal was not 
binding and could be renounced, should be regarded as no longer in force. 
Although the Romans may have observed this rule against the background 
of their freedom of divorce, marriage in Groenewegen’s own days was indis-
soluble and, accordingly, betrothals were binding, even if this implied that a 
fiancé had to enter into matrimony against his will. Betrothal was put on a 
par with contracts of good faith, which cannot be withdrawn from unilateral-
ly.26 
Until now, only indirect coercive means were used to enforce the betrothal. 
The canon lawyers always referred to ecclesiastical sanctions, while Groe-
newegen spoke about incarceration. When, however, the eighteenth-century 
Utrecht Professor Jacobus Voorda (1698-1768) described the enforcement of 
betrothals in the legal practice of his day, he stated that courts were compe-
tent to solemnly pronounce a marriage to be concluded or to have their clerk 
represent the unwilling fiancé and perform the marriage anyway.27 This im-
plies that over the course of time it had apparently also become accepted to 
                                                
23  Thomas Sanchez, Disputationum de sancto matrimonii sacramento tomi tres, Ant-
werp 1607, Liber I, disp. 29, no. 4 (Vol. I, 67-68). 
24  Paulus Christinaeus, Practicarum quaestionum rerumque in supremis Belgarum 
curiis actarum et observatarum decisiones Vol. II and III, Antwerp 1626, Vol. III, 
decis. 124, no. 44 (567). 
25  Antonius Perezus, Praelectiones in duodecim libros codicis Justiniani, Tomus I, 
Antwerp-Amsterdam 1645, ad C. 5.1, no. 11 (352). 
26  S. Groenewegen van der Made, Tractatus de legibus abrogatis et inusitatis in Hol-
landia vicinisque regionibus III, B. Beinart, M.L. Hewett (eds.) (Johannesburg 
1984) ad C. 5.1.1.1 (p. 233).  
27  Jacobus Voorda, Dictata ad ius hodiernum I-II, M.L. Hewett (ed.) (Amsterdam 
2005) ad D. 23.1 (p. 850-852). Such a thing was not accepted in the law of 
Guelders. See Johannes Schrassert, Practicae observations I (Harderwijk 1736) 
observatio 229 (p. 355-356). 
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use direct coercion as a means of enforcing betrothals. There are two premis-
es that made such a thing possible. The first is that the fiancé’s physical pre-
sence was no longer required to conclude the marriage. As the Roman-Dutch 
jurist Simon van Leeuwen explained, Roman law, canon law and customary 
law allowed a marriage to be concluded by letter or by a representative. A 
messenger specifically commissioned for the purpose could, for example, ful-
fil the matrimonial formalities in the presence of the church, the court or 
even an officer of the Dutch East India Company (VOC).28 The second pre-
mise consisted in the idea, defended by the Protestant jurist Benedikt 
Carpzov (1595-1666), that consent could be based on the authority of the 
court. Accordingly, a judicial sentence could supply the agreement lacking 
between the intended spouses. It should be noted, however, that Carpzov 
was speaking here about the absence of parental consent for the marriage of 
children, not about an unwilling fiancé. As far as means of compelling the 
latter were concerned Carpzov only mentioned admonition, detention and 
allocating the fiancé’s assets to his future wife.29 
The competence of the court to pronounce a marriage to be concluded is de-
scribed at length in a monograph on matrimonial law that was written in 
Amsterdam around 1665 by one Hendrik Brouwer. The exposé starts with a 
quotation from the Stoic philosopher Epictetus (ca. 50 - ca. 120 AD) to the ef-
fect that no-one can deprive another of his will (Golden Sayings 83) and by 
stating that no marriage can be concluded without free consent. Subsequent-
ly, however, coercive measures are referred to. Firstly there are two indirect 
measures, viz civil detention and allocation of the man’s assets to his future 
wife so that these will support her in conformity with the capacity and digni-
ty of the sentenced defendant (with a reference to D. 37.9.1.19). If even then 
the fiancé is not prepared to enter the marriage, there is scope for direct coer-
cion. The judge has the competence to declare the claiming maiden and the 
present or absent defendant to be married and any offspring to be legitima-
ted.30 Such a far-reaching measure was justified by stating that just as the 
body of a free person cannot be monetarily assessed, neither could the hope 
for a happy and harmonious marriage be assessed in coins, while taking 
nuptial vows was an easy task, at least if the promisor was prepared to do 
                                                
28  Simon van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis (Leiden 1662) lib. I, cap. 14, no. 8 (p. 80): 
‘Et meo tempore in Societatis Indiae Orientalis ministro, cui hic per procuratorem ux-
or, eique maritus absens matrimonio juncti fuere, factitatum et admissum memini’. 
29  Benedictus Carpzov, Opus definitionum ecclesiasticum seu consistorialium (Leip-
zig 1685) lib. II, tit. III, definit. 53, nos. 14-15 (p. 81), tit. VIII, definit. 135, no. 12 
(p. 205) and definit. 136 , no. 2-12 (p. 207-208). 
30  Henricus Brouwer, De iure connubiorum libri duo (Delft 1714) lib. I, cap. 24, no. 
23 (p. 255).  
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so.31 The same approach can be found in the commentary on the Digest by 
the Utrecht Professor Johannes Voet (1647-1713). The dilatory or hesitant fi-
ancé could be exhorted by the magistrate and put into civil detention. More-
over, if desired, the magistrate could solemnly declare him to be married or 
order the marriage to be concluded by a civil servant (apparitor) representing 
the fiancé. Voet also shared Brouwer’s opinion that a judicial decree could 
replace the debtor’s consent and that the nature of betrothal prevented it 
from being monetarily assessed.32  
As Voorda taught in his lectures on contemporary law, this was the common 
legal practice in eighteenth-century Holland. Nevertheless this practice was 
destined to disappear in the nineteenth century, when Dutch family law 
adopted an entirely secularized matrimonial law from the French Code civil 
and, as a consequence, marriage lost its sanctity and was no longer regarded 
as indissoluble. At the same time it was increasingly considered unacceptable 
to declare people to be married against their will.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
In summary, we have seen two examples of direct coercive measures being 
used in order to enforce performance of a certain act by the debtor. Chaining 
the copyist to his desk until the work was finished implied an infringement 
of the debtor’s physical integrity, while completely ignoring the will of a fi-
ancé by declaring him to be married implied an infringement of the debtor’s 
mental integrity: the act is performed on his behalf, but against his will. We 
have seen that both coercive measures were apparently accepted throughout 
a certain period in the development of the continental legal tradition, but as 
exceptions to the principal rule that no-one could be compelled to perform a 
certain act. Moreover, specific justification was given in both instances. 
Chaining the copyist to his desk was justified by the public interest that had 
to prevail, while declaring the fiancé to be married was justified by the sanc-
tity and indissolubleness of matrimony and the very nature of the obligation, 
implying that damages could not make good the prejudice of a cancelled 
marriage. Both measures were destined to disappear, just as they once 
emerged, and in both instances it was the awareness of human freedom or, in 
                                                
31  Ibidem, no. 22 (p. 254-255): ‘Jam autem non recipit aestimationem liberum corpus, 
nec felix concorsque speratum matrimonium nummis aestimari potest: at in matrimo-
nio corpora simulque et animi traduntur et praestatio nuptiarum promissarum, modo 
uelit sponsor, facilis est’. 
32  Johannes Voet, Commentarius ad pandectas II (The Hague 1704) ad D. 23.1, no. 
12 (p. 6-7). 
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the nineteenth century, the awareness of constitutional rights that eventually 
prevailed over the duty to live up to one’s promise. 
Looking back over the developments in the continental law of obligations 
since the reception of Roman law, there are not many other examples of di-
rect coercive measures aimed at obtaining the debtor’s performance of a cer-
tain act. Some can be found in the nineteenth century. We can find an exam-
ple of a direct coercive measure implying an infringement of the debtor’s 
physical integrity in the mercantile law of some jurisdictions: signed up sail-
ors could be brought aboard with the limb of the law (or the Seemannsamt),33 
while an example of a direct coercive measure implying an infringement of 
the debtor’s mental integrity can be found in the enforcement of contracts to 
sell registrable property. Here the debtor’s assistance in drawing up the no-
tarial instrument of delivery could be replaced by a judicial decree that ig-
nored the vendor’s resistance.34 Both these measures also subsequently dis-
appeared as a result of an increasing awareness of constitutional rights. Thus, 
we may conclude that eventually the appraisal between fidelity to the given 
word and human freedom, worked out – at least for obligations to perform a 
positive act – in favour of the latter, while our conclusion in the exceptional 
instance in which this was not the case should indeed be that this was an 
atypical solution for an atypical case.  
 
 
                                                
33  See the Dutch Wetboek van Koophandel (1838) art. 402 (old) and the German 
Seemannsordnung (1872) § 29. 
34  On only one occasion did a Dutch court rule that judicial authorization could 
take the place of an instrument of conveyance, viz in a judgement of the Dis-
trict Court of Rotterdam in 1896 (W. 6862). This decision was rejected both in 
appeal (W. 7076) and in cassation (W. 7302).  
